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Using Candidate Race to Define MinorityPreferred Candidates Under Section 2 of the
Voting Rights Act
Scott Yutt
Congress passed the Voting Rights Act of 1965 ("VRA")' to
protect the voting rights of minority citizens. At the time of
passage few minorities had the money, resources, or opportunity
to serve as candidates for elected office, and voting rules made it
difficult for minorities to vote or elect their preferred candidate.
Some states, counties, and cities, particularly in the South,
created election rules and structured election districts to prevent
minority citizens either. from voting or from having a reasonable
chance of electing a candidate of their choice. The VRA prohibited states and political subdivisions from applying practices and
procedures that denied or abridged "the right of any citizen of the
United States to vote on account of race or color."2
Minority plaintiffs have used the VRA effectively in litigation
against discriminatory election practices that prevent minority
citizens from registering and voting. As a result, the typical
modern VRA claim is not about the denial of 'the right to vote,
but about the denial of the right to an equal opportunity to elect
representatives of choice, sometimes called "minority vote dilution."3
In 1982, Congress amended the VRA's language to respond
to these changed circumstances. Section 2 now guarantees that
all citizens, regardless of race or color, have an equal opportunity
"to participate in the political process and to elect representatives
of their choice."4 The VRA provides that a court should evaluate
claims "based on the totality of circumstances," and that "[t]he
extent to which [minorities] have been elected to office ... may

t B.S. 1983, Kent State University; M.S. 1985, Ohio State University; J.D. Candidate
1996, University of Chicago.
42 USC § 1973 (1988).
Id.
Thornburg v Gingles, 478 US 30, 46 (1986)(finding impermissible vote dilution in
state legislature's redistricting plan).
4 42 USC § 1973.
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be considered" in this evaluation. However, the rights created by
the VRA do not include "a right to have [minorities]5 elected in
numbers equal to their proportion in the population."
Neither the VRA nor the Supreme Court has defined what a
candidate must do or be to qualify as a "representative of choice"
or "minority-preferred candidate," terms the Supreme Court has
used interchangeably." Courts do not agree whether white candidates can be minority-preferred candidates, nor do they agree
whether minority candidates are, by definition, minority-preferred candidates. Resolving these issues remains critical because
Section 2 vote-dilution claims largely turn on the electoral success or failure of minority-preferred candidates.7
In Thornburg v Gingles, the Supreme Court interpreted the
1982 amendments but did not reach a consensus on how to define
"minority-preferred candidate."9 Three distinct interpretations
arose. Justice Byron White implied that all minority candidates,
and only minority candidates, can be minority-preferred candidates.10 Justice Sandra Day O'Connor treated candidate race as
one of several factors for a court to consider when determining
who is a minority-preferred candidate. 1 Justice William
Brennan, Jr. embraced a strictly race-neutral test under which
candidate race is irrelevant. 2
Part I of this Comment discusses the history of the VRA, the
purpose and language of the 1982 amendments, and the three
tests generated by Gingles. Part II describes the split among the
federal circuits following Gingles. The Fifth and Seventh Circuits
have applied the strictly race-conscious rule, 3 the Eleventh

Id.
Gingles, 478 US at 50-51.
Since Section 2 is basically designed to afford minority voters an equal opportunity
to elect representatives of their choice, evidence that minority voters have succeeded in
doing just that weakens the strength of a Section 2 claim. This is stated as factor seven of
the Senate Report accompanying the 1982 VRA amendments. See Senate Judiciary Report

on the Voting Rights Act Extension, S Rep No 97-417, 97th Cong, 2d Sess 28-29 (1982).
Gingles, 478 US at 30.
o The Gingles Court discussed this term but failed to reach majority agreement on
the role played by candidate race in the definition. See id at 83 (White concurring).

10 Id.

1 Id at 101 (O'Connor concurring).
Gingles, 478 US at 67.

12

See Citizens for a Better Gretna v City of Gretna, La., 834 F2d 496, 503 (5th Cir
1987)(affirming vote-dilution claim by rejecting argument that white candidates in whiteonly elections were minority preferred); League of United Latin American Citizens,
Council No. 4434 v Clements, 999 F2d 831, 861 (5th Cir 1993)("LULAC IV")(rejecting a

vote-dilution claim for county-wide elections for state trial judges by looking at nonracial
causes of racially polarized voting); Baird v Consolidated City of Indianapolis, 976 F2d
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Circuit has applied the strictly race-neutral rule,14 and the
Third and Tenth Circuits have taken the middle position that
uses candidate race as one factor to define "minority-preferred
candidate."" In part III, this Comment analyzes the three competing tests and proposes that because not all minority candidates are minority-preferred candidates, and because some white
candidates are minority-preferred candidates, a court should
reject Justice White's test and not use candidate race as a proxy
for minority-preferred candidate. On the other hand, because
minority candidates are historically more likely to be minoritypreferred candidates, a court should reject Justice Brennan's test
that ignores candidate race. Instead, a court should adopt a test
similar to Justice O'Connor's and use candidate race as one factor
in close cases to determine who is a minority-preferred candidate. 6
A court should use candidate race only in close cases because
evidence of how minorities actually vote is a much better indicator than race. When statistical minority voting patterns clearly
demonstrate a preference among candidates, a court should give
that factor great weight in identifying minority-preferred candidates, while ignoring candidate race. When minority voting
patterns do not clearly demonstrate a preference, then a court
should increasingly consider other factors, including: candidate
race; minority voter turnout; candidate statements about what
constituency she represents; minority community support for the
candidate during the campaign; and factors mentioned in the
1982 amendments' legislative history.

357, 361 (7th Cir 1992)(denying vote-dilution claim based on the election of an AfricanAmerican Republican receiving strong support from white voters).
"4 See CarrolltonBranch of the NAACP v Stallings, 829 F2d 1547, 1557 (11th Cir

1987)(upholding the vote-dilution claim of African-American voters in Carroll County,
Georgia).
" See Sanchez v Bond, 875 F2d 1488, 1495 (10th Cir 1989)(rejecting vote-dilution
claim of Hispanic-American plaintiffs by finding that Hispanic-Americans controlled the
Democratic party that had sponsored successfully elected white candidates); Jenkins v
Red Clay Consolidated School District Board of Ed., 4 F3d 1103, 1115-16 (3d Cir
1993Xdefining a flexible approach that uses candidate race as one factor to define minority-preferred candidate).
" See Jenkins, 4 F3d at 1126.
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I. THE SUPREME COURT HAS FAILED TO AGREE ON A DEFINITION
OF "MINORITY-PREFERRED CANDIDATE" UNDER SECTION 2 OF THE
VOTING RIGHTS ACT

A. The 1982 Voting Rights Act Amendments' Rejection of the
Intent Requirement for Section 2 Vote-Dilution Claims
The original VRA language prohibited states and political
subdivisions from using voting prerequisites, standards, practices, or procedures to deny or abridge citizens' right to vote on
account of race or color.17 In White v Regester,5 the Supreme
Court gave meaning to this protection by defining the legal test
for a vote-dilution claim. The Court required plaintiffs to show
that under "the totality of the circumstances" minority members
"had less opportunity than did other residents in the district to
participate in the political processes and to elect legislators of
their choice."19 The test did not require plaintiffs to show that
the state or political subdivision engaged in the election practice
with an intent to discriminate against minorities."
Although the White test clearly rejected an intent requirement, it did not state which facts a court should consider in evaluating electoral opportunity, nor did it set forth the manner in
which a court should compare minority opportunity to white
opportunity.2 The Fifth Circuit, in Zimmer v McKeithen,2 2 proposed a list of relevant factors to fill these gaps in the Supreme
Court's White test. A minority group could show unequal electoral opportunity if it could
demonstrate a lack of access to the process of slating
candidates, the unresponsiveness of legislators to their
particularized interests, a tenuous state policy underlying the preference for multi-member or at-large
districting, or that the existence of past discrimination

'7 Prior to the 1982 amendments, Section 2 provided: "No voting qualification or
prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or procedure shall be imposed or applied by
any State or political subdivision to deny or abridge the right of any citizen of the United
States to vote on account of race or color." 42 USC § 1973 (1965).
'8

412 US 755 (1973).

Id at 766.
2 See Thornburg v Gingles, 478 US 30, 35 (1986)(discussing the "results test" as applied by the White Court).
21 Chandler Davidson, The Voting Rights Act: A Brief History, in Bernard Grofman
and Chandler Davidson, eds, Controversies in Minority Voting 7, 32-34 (Brookings Institution, 1992)(noting the lack of specific direction provided by White).
2 Zimmer v McKeithen, 485 F2d 1297 (5th Cir 1973), afrd as East Carroll Parish
School Bd.v Marshall,424 US 636 (1976).
"
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in general precludes the effective participation in the
election system .... Such proof is enhanced by a showing of the existence of large districts, majority vote
requirements, anti-single shot voting provisions and the
lack of provision for at-large candidates running from

particular geographical subdistricts."
Nevertheless, in City of Mobile v Bolden,24 a Supreme Court
plurality departed from prior case law by requiring Section 2
plaintiffs to show discriminatory intent.25 The Bolden court
placed the burden on the plaintiff to show that the government
designed or maintained the challenged election system to further
racial discrimination. 6
27
In response to Bolden, the 1982 amendments to the VRA
codified the White holding that discriminatory effect was sufficient to sustain a vote-dilution claim.2 ' The Senate Report accompanying the amendments stated that the "intent
29
test.., places an unacceptably difficult burden on plaintiffs"

Zimmer, 485 F2d at 1305. In Marshall the Supreme Court affirmed the use of
these "Zimmerfactors" to evaluate minority electoral opportunity. See Gingles, 478 US at
36 n 4 (discussing the Marshall and the Zimmer factors).
24 446 US 55, 62 (1980).
' See Frank R. Parker, The "Results" Test of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act:
Abandoning the Intent Standard, 69 Va L Rev 715, 729-46 (1983)(discussing the intent
requirement in Bolden).
26 Justice Stewart, writing for the plurality, wrote that "[a] plaintiff must prove that
the disputed plan was 'conceived or operated as [a] purposeful devicte] to further racial ... discrimination.'" Bolden, 446 US at 66, citing Whitcomb v Chavis, 403 US 124,
149 (1971).
27
Section 2, as amended, provides:
(a) No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard, practice, or
procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State or political subdivision in a
manner which results in a denial or abridgment of the right of any citizen of the
United States to vote on account of race or color, or in contravention of the guarantees set forth in section 1973b(f)(2) of this title, as provided in subsection (b).
(b) A violation of subsection (a) of this section is established if, based on the
totality of circumstances, it is shown that the political processes leading to nomination or election in the State or political subdivision are not equally open to
participation by members of a class of citizens protected by subsection (a) of this
section in that its members have less opportunity than other members of the
electorate to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of
their choice. The extent to which members of a protected class have been elected
to office in the State or political subdivision is one circumstance which may be
considered: Provided, That nothing in this section establishes a right to have
members of a protected class elected in numbers equal to their proportion in the
population.
42 USC § 1973.
Gingles, 478 US at 35.
2 Senate Judiciary Committee Report on the Voting Rights Act Extension, S Rep No
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and that "the Committee has amended Section 2 to permit plain-

tiffs to prove violations by showing that minority voters were
denied an equal chance to participate in the political process, i.e.
by meeting the pre-Bolden results test." ° The Senate Report
also directed courts to consider the Zimmer factors when adjudicating Section 2 vote-dilution cases."
B.

The Gingles Court Created a Three-Part Test to Determine
Section 2 Vote-Dilution Claims

In 1986, the Supreme Court interpreted the amended Section
2 in Thornburg v Gingles."2 The plaintiffs, registered AfricanAmerican voters in North Carolina, challenged six multimember
districts and one single-member district in the state legislature's
redistricting plan.33 The plaintiffs alleged that the challenged
districts impaired minority citizens' ability "to elect representatives of their choice" in violation of Section 2."' The Court unani-

97-417, 97th Cong, 2d Sess 16 (1982)(cited in note 7).
'o Id.
"' The factors noted by the Senate Report are:
1. the extent of any history of official discrimination in the state or political
subdivision that touched the right of the members of the minority group to register, to vote, or otherwise to participate in the democratic process;
2. the extent to which voting in the elections of the state or political subdivision
is racially polarized;
3. the extent to which the state or political subdivision has used unusually large
election districts, majority vote requirements, anti-single shot provisions, or
other voting practices or procedures that may enhance the opportunity for discrimination against the minority group;
4. if there is a candidate slating process, whether the members of the minority
group have been denied access to that process;
5. the extent to which members of the minority group in the state or political
subdivision bear the effects of discrimination in such areas as education, employment and health, which hinder their ability to participate effectively in the
political process;
6. whether political campaigns have been characterized by overt or subtle racial
appeals;
7. the extent to which members of the minority group have been elected to public office in the jurisdiction.
Additional factors that in some cases have had probative value as part of
plaintiffs' evidence to establish a violation are: whether there is a significant
lack of responsiveness on the part of elected officials to particularized needs of
the members of the minority group; whether the policy underlying the state or
political subdivision's use of such voting qualification, prerequisite to voting, or
standard, practice or procedure is tenuous.
Id at 28-29.
'2 478 US at 30.
33 Id at 35.
'

Id.
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mously held that impermissible vote dilution existed in six of the
seven challenged districts.35
The majority opinion required plaintiffs to prove three "necessary preconditions" to establish their vote-dilution claim: (1)
that the minority population was "sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a majority in a single-member
district";36 (2) that the minority group was "politically cohesive";" and (3) that the white majority voted sufficiently as a
bloc "usually to defeat the minority's preferred candidate."38
The Gingles test emphasized the concept of racial bloc voting.
The Gingles Court equated the terms "racial bloc voting" and
"racially polarized voting," defining them as either "'a consistent
relationship between the race of the voter and the way in which
the voter votes,'" or a situation in which "'[African-American]
voters and white voters vote differently.""'3 Under the Gingles
test, racial bloc voting is far more important than the other Senate Report factors because a showing of racial-bloc voting satisfies two of the three test elements. 0 First, racially polarized
voting requires minority voters to have voted alike; this requirement establishes political cohesiveness. 4 ' Second, racially polarized voting requires majority voters to have voted alike, thus
showing majority voter cohesiveness that will usually result in
the defeat of the minority-preferred candidate.42
C.

Defining the Term "Minority-Preferred Candidate" Affects
the Outcome of the Gingles Test

At the core of a Section 2 claim is a minority group asserting
that it lacks an equal opportunity to elect its preferred candidates.' The plaintiffs attempt to establish a violation by showing that the white majority usually defeats the minority-pre-

Id at 42.
Gingles, 478 US at 50.
17 Id at 51.
3
Id.
Id at 52-53 n 18 and n 21.
40 The Court noted that under a "functional view" of the political process as mandated by the Senate Report, "the most important Senate Report factors bearing on § 2
challenges to multimember districts are the 'extent to which minority group members
have been elected to public office in the jurisdiction' and the 'extent to which voting in the
elections of the state or political subdivision is racially polarized.'" Gingles, 478 US at 48 n
15, citing S Rep No 97-417 at 28-29 (cited in note 7).
41 Gingles, 478 US at 56.
42

Id.
Id at 35.
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ferred candidates at the polls." Where a court defines "minoritypreferred candidate" to include more successful candidates, the
plaintiffs claim will be weaker.' Conversely, where a court defines the term to include less successful candidates, the plaintiffs
claim will be stronger. A simple example shows that a court's
definition of the term "minority-preferred candidate," and the role
of candidate race in that definition, affects the outcome of a Section 2 vote-dilution claim.
Suppose that in a Section 2 case the plaintiff presents as
evidence an election between an African-American candidate and
a white candidate in a county that is 30 percent African-American and 70 percent white. Suppose further that none of the African-Americans voted for the African-American candidate because
they thought that candidate would not represent their interests
and that all of the whites voted for the African-American candidate. Garnering 70 percent of the total vote, the African-American candidate would win the election. Given these facts, the court
must then decide if the African-American candidate is a minority-preferred candidate.
One way of defining "minority-preferred candidate" is to ignore completely the candidate's race and to look instead at other
factors, such as whether minority citizens voted for the candidate. This plain-meaning approach to defining "minority-preferred candidate" effectuates the Section 2 language guaranteeing
minority citizens the equal opportunity "to elect representatives
of their choice." By this definition of "minority-preferred candidate," it is hard to imagine how the candidate in the above hypothetical could be called minority-preferred where not a single
minority voted for him. The plaintiff would have a stronger Section 2 vote-dilution case because the winning candidate is not,
and cannot be, a minority-preferred candidate.
A completely different way to define "minority-preferred candidate" is to rely exclusively on the candidate's race. By this definition, minority candidates are minority-preferred candidates,
and white candidates are not minority-preferred candidates. This
definition uses candidate race as a proxy for "minority-preferred
candidate." If a court encountering the hypothetical situation
above utilized this definition, then the winning African-American
candidate would be, by definition, a minority-preferred candidate,
and the minority community's apparent success at electing mi-

Id at 48.
See note 7.
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nority-preferred candidates would undermine the plaintiffs Section 2 vote-dilution claim.
D. The Supreme Court in Gingles Did Not Agree on How to
Define "Minority-Preferred Candidate"
The Gingles Court did not reach a majority consensus on the
appropriate definition of "minority-preferred candidate."4" The
Justices disagreed specifically about the role that a candidate's
race should play in that definition.47 Underlying this disagreement was whether a court should distinguish between minority
voter electoral failure caused by racial discrimination and minority voter electoral failure caused by "interest group politics."'
Both Justices White and O'Connor wrote concurring opinions
in Gingles in which they observed that something other than
racial discrimination could cause racially polarized voting and
that the cause of racially polarized voting is important under
Section 2. In particular, both opinions endorsed the idea that
when differing political or socioeconomic characteristics of whites
and minorities explain racially polarized voting, Section 2 does
not protect that cause of minority voter electoral failure-what
Justice White called "interest group politics."49 For example,
46 Gingles, 478 US at 83 (White concurring).

Both Justices White and O'Connor found that the role of a candidate's race in
Section 2 claims was irrelevant to the disposition of the case. Nonetheless, it was discussed at length in the opinions. Id at 83 (White concurring)("[Oln the facts of this case,
there is no need to draw the voter/candidate distinction."); id at 101 (O'Connor concurring)("I agree with Justice White that Justice Brennan's conclusion that the race of the
candidate is always irrelevant in identifying racially polarized voting.., is not necessary
to the disposition of this case.").
48 This Comment does not directly address the separate question of whether causes
other than race explain racially polarized voting. This topic is addressed in Comment,
Straight Party Tickets and Redistricting Thickets: Nonracial Motivations for Voter Preference, 1995 U Chi Legal F 505. This Comment does analyze whether candidate race is a
useful determinant to distinguish causes, assuming that courts will engage in this causation inquiry.
" Gingles, 478 US at 83. Both Justices White and O'Connor considered Justice
Brennan's race-neutral position in Gingles to be at odds with White, 412 US at 755, and
Whitcomb, 403 US at 124. Both referred to that portion of Whitcomb in which the Court
explicitly rejected proportional representation for" 'any group with distinctive interests,' "
sufficient numbers, and necessary compactness. Gingles, 478 US at 98 (O'Connor concurring), citing Whitcomb, 403 US at 156. Justice White focused on the interest-group politics
aspects of White and Whitcomb, arguing that Brennan's rule would protect interest-group
politics. See Gingles, 478 US at 83 (White concurring). Although Justice O'Connor was
also concerned about overprotecting interest-group politics, she did not agree that "evidence that the divergent racial voting patterns may be explained in part by causes other
than race" should not be admissible for some purposes. Gingles, 478 US at 100 (O'Connor
concurring). She did not join the majority opinion primarily because it did not respect the
17
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where minorities usually vote Democratic and whites usually
vote Republican, and where Republicans generally win elections,
a court should determine whether racial discrimination or "interest group politics" causes the candidate for whom the minorities
vote to lose.50
Unlike Justices White and O'Connor, Justice Brennan rejected the idea that a court should consider the causes of racially
polarized voting.5 He opined that when minority citizens vote
for one candidate and white citizens for another, those facts support a Section 2 vote-dilution claim regardless of why the two
groups vote in different ways.52 Justice Brennan noted that
since citizen race and socioeconomic characteristics are tightly
correlated, when a court admits evidence about the causes of
racially polarized voting, the court requires plaintiffs to show
that whites vote with the intent to discriminate against minorities.53 He argued that considering causation would reintroduce
an intent requirement into Section 2 of the VRA that Congress
clearly abolished in the 1982 amendments.5 4
This disagreement over the admissibility of causation evidence was the primary basis for the opinions' different positions
on the use of candidate race to define "minority-preferred candidate." Justice White's requirement that race be the cause of actionable racially polarized voting under Section 2 means that
candidate race is crucial to his definition of "minority-preferred
candidate."5 5
Justice White gave an example in his Gingles concurrence to
show why candidate race is critical.55 He posited an election in
which whites, voting for a Republican ticket, successfully elect
both white and minority Republicans, and in which minorities,

balance struck by Congress regarding proportional representation. Id at 84-85 (White
concurring).
Justice White described this outcome in his concurrence. Id at 83.
Id at 62.
52 Gingles, 478 US at 63.
Id at 66-67.
" See id at 70-71 ("To accept this theory would frustrate the goals Congress sought to
achieve by repudiating the intent test of Mobile v Bolden..
Id at 83 (White concurring).
Gingles, 478 US at 83 (White concurring).
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voting for the Democratic ticket, fail to elect any candidates.57
The hypothetical's goal is to show that when whites elect minority candidates, race simply cannot be the cause of any observed
racially polarized voting.58
Justice White argued that race could not be the cause of the
racially polarized voting because neither the race of the candidate nor the race of the voters explains the voting pattern.59
First, he argued that candidate race does not explain the racially
polarized voting pattern because whites vote for both white and
minority candidates. 0 Second, he argued that voter race does
not explain the racially polarized voting pattern either.61 His
logic was that when white voters elect minority candidates, those
white voters do not act based on their race. If white voters voted
because of their race, they would only vote for white candidates.62 But because white voters also vote for and elect minority candidates, those white voters act according to their political
beliefs, not their race.63 Justice White labeled this phenomenon
"interest group politics.""
Justice White's reasoning renders candidate race not only
critical to determining who is a minority-preferred candidate, but
dispositive. By this reasoning, any time white voters elect minority candidates, some shared social, economic, religious, political,
or other factor common to the white voters and the minority
candidate explains the racially polarized voting. As a consequence, the racially polarized voting is not actionable under Section 2.
In her concurrence, Justice O'Connor also recommended that
a court should consider the causes of racially polarized voting.65
According to Justice O'Connor, where the political affiliations of
minorities and whites differ, and that difference explains why
minorities vote for one candidate and whites for another, a court
should question whether racially polarized voting, as defined
under Section 2 of the VRA, exists.66 Justice O'Connor did not
agree with Justice White that this causation inquiry meant that
57

Id.
Id.

Id.
o Gingles, 478 US at 83 (White concurring).
61 Id.

6 Id.
Id.
6 Gingles, 478 US at 83 (White concurring).
Id at 100-01 (O'Connor concurring).
6 Id.
6
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every minority candidate would be a minority-preferred candidate, and that candidate race would be the only factor needed to
define minority-preferred candidate.67 Instead, she considered
candidate race as only one of several factors used to define minority-preferred candidate.68
Finally, because Justice Brennan considered racially polarized voting to exist whenever voter race correlates with voter
preference, independent of the causes of that correlation, his test
does not incorporate candidate race.6 9 He proposed a strictly
race-neutral rule under which "the race of the candidate per se is
irrelevant to racial bloc voting analysis."7 ° Justice Brennan supported his definition of "minority-preferred candidate" on two
grounds: (1) it follows from the statutory language7 1 and (2) it
satisfies the reasons for requiring a showing of racial bloc voting.72 First, Justice Brennan interpreted the VRA's phrase "representatives of their choice" under a plain-meaning approach.7 3 He
argued that if Congress had meant to say that all minority candidates, and only minority candidates, are minority-preferred candidates, it would have done so." Second, Brennan asserted that
using the candidate's race in the inquiry does not further the
underlying purposes of examining racial bloc voting-to establish
minority group political cohesiveness and to show how submergence in a majority district prevents' the minority group from
electing a candidate of its choice.7" He argued that these goals
depend only on the voters' race and the ballots they cast, not on
the candidate's race.78
II. THE FEDERAL CIRCUITS HAVE SPLIT OVER How TO DEFINE
"MINORITY-PREFERRED CANDIDATE"

Because the majority in Thornburg v Gingles77 failed to
agree on a definition of "minority-preferred candidate," the lower
federal courts have examined this issue.78 The positions of Jus67

Id.
Gingles, 478 US at 100-01 (O'Connor concurring).

SId at 66.
70 Id at 67.

Id at 67-69.
Gingles, 478 US at 68-69.
71 Id at 67-68.
71 Id at 68.
71

72

71

Id at 69.

76

Gingles, 478 US at 68.
478 US 30 (1986).
As one court noted, "[t]he courts of appeals, in the absence of explicit direction

7
78
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tices Brennan, White, and O'Connor have each garnered support
from at least one federal circuit: the Fifth and Seventh Circuits
have adopted Justice White's strictly race-conscious rule;79 the
Eleventh Circuit has applied Justice Brennan's strictly race-neutral rule;"° the Third and Tenth Circuits have applied Justice
O'Connor's test by taking race into account as one factor in determining who constitutes a minority-preferred candidate.81
The Fifth and Seventh Circuits Have Applied Justice White's
Strictly Race-Conscious Rule

A.

The Fifth Circuit developed a strictly race-conscious approach in two seminal cases, Citizens for a Better Gretna v City of
Gretna 2 and League of United Latin American Citizens, Council
No. 4434 v Clements ("LULAC IV")." The Gretna court ruled

that "Gingles is properly interpreted to hold that the race of the
candidate is in general of less significance than the race of the
voter-but only within the context of an election that offers voters the choice of supporting a viable minority candidate."8" In
establishing this rule, the court used candidate race but refrained
from holding that a minority candidate is always a minoritypreferred candidate.85 The Gretna court attempted to use candidate race to distinguish racial discrimination from other possible
causes of racially polarized voting. The court reiterated Justice
White's concerns about "the dangers in advancing interest group
politics or enforcing proportional representation." 8

from the Supreme Court, have adopted a variety of approaches to determining which
candidates are minority-preferred." Jenkins v Red Clay Consolidated School District
Board of Ed., 4 F3d 1103, 1125 (3d Cir 1993).
" See Citizens for a Better Gretna v City of Gretna, 834 F2d 496, 503 (5th Cir 1987);
League of United Latin American Citizens, Council No. 4434 v Clements, 999 F2d 831, 861
(5th Cir 1993) ("LULAC IV"); Baird v Consolidated City of Indianapolis,976 F2d 357, 361
(7th Cir 1992).
'o See CarrolltonBranch of the NAACP v Stallings, 829 F2d 1547, 1557 (11th Cir

1987).
" See Sanchez v Bond, 875 F2d 1488, 1495 (10th Cir 1989); Jenkins, 4 F3d at 111516.
8

834 F2d at 496.

999 F2d at 831.
" Gretna, 834 F2d at 503. The court further noted that "implicit in the Gingles holding is the notion that [African-American] preference is determined from elections which
'3

offer the choice of [an African-American] candidate." Id at 503-04. See also Campos v City
of Baytown, Tex., 840 F2d 1240, 1245 (5th Cir 1988)(holding that there was no evidence
that white-only elections offered a "viable minority candidate").
Gretna, 834 F2d at 503-04.
Id at 503.
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The Gretna court ultimately upheld a vote-dilution claim,
rejecting the defendants' argument that successful white candidates in elections with only white candidates were often minority-preferred candidates.8 7 The court excluded those elections
because the whites could not be minority-preferred candidates. 8
In LULAC IV, the Fifth Circuit found that a court can reject
vote-dilution claims based upon evidence that factors other than
race caused racially polarized voting.89 The court held that when
partisan affiliation, not race, is the best explanation, no Section 2
violation exists.9 0
The plaintiffs in LULAC IV challenged Texas's system of
electing state trial judges in county-wide elections, claiming that
the system impermissibly diluted Hispanic-American and African-American voting power. 1 The court relied on the successful
election of African-American Republicans and the repeated losses
of white Democrats to conclude that partisan politics, not race,
was the cause of racially polarized voting. The court wrote that
The race of the candidate did not affect the pattern.
White voters' support for [African-American] Republican
candidates was equal to or greater than their support
for white Republicans. Likewise, [African-American]
and white Democratic candidates received equal percentages of the white vote. Given these facts, we cannot
see how minority-preferred judicial92 candidates were
defeated 'on account of race or color.'
In other words, although racially polarized voting existed, it
did not result from racial discrimination if whites elected AfricanAmerican Republicans. This position might be true if the only
type of racial discrimination targeted by the VRA was discrimination against candidates. White voters that elect minority candidates are not discriminating against those candidates. Those

87 Id at 503-04.

The appellant claimed that the district court erred by affirming the Section 2 claim
strictly on the basis of elections with at least one African-American candidate. The appellant wanted the court to consider elections in which minority voters supported winning
white candidates. The court applied a quasi-race-conscious rule, stating that "Gingles is
properly interpreted to hold that the race of the candidate is in general of less significance

than the race of the voter-but only within the context of an election that offers voters the
choice of supporting a viable minority candidate." Id at 503.
'9 LULAC /V,999 F2d at 879.
'0 Id at 879.
"I Id at 837-38.
92

Id at 879.
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same white voters, however, may discriminate against the minority community if the white voters elect minority candidates who
support programs that directly or indirectly disadvantage minority citizens.
The Seventh Circuit reached the same conclusion on similar
9 3 a case
reasoning in Baird v Consolidated City of Indianapolis,
with facts comparable to those of LULAC IV. The court refused to
discount the election of an African-American Republican even
though he received only a small fraction of the minority vote. 4
In Baird, African-American voters challenged the system for
electing council members in Marion County, Indiana, a county
where minorities constituted 19 percent of the voting-age population. 5 The county had twenty-nine council seats, twenty-five of
which were filled in single-member elections, and the other four
of which were filled by an at-large election. 6 Plaintiffs claimed
that7 the four-seat, at-large election diluted minority voting pow9
er.
Seven of the twenty-five single-member districts had a 60
percent African-American population, and in the most recent
county election, candidates favored by African-American voters
carried all seven districts.98 Thus, minority voters controlled seven of twenty-nine seats, or 24 percent of the total. 99 Commenting on the council's composition after those elections, the court
stated that "[aill questions of intentional discrimination to one
side, §2(b) also implies that African-Americans who have influence proportional to their numbers do not state a claim under
§2(a)." 100 Despite the more than proportional minority representation, the court went on to address the legality of the four-seat,
at-large district."'
The court rejected the Section 2 claim because one of the atlarge council members was African-American, even though minorities did not favor him in the election. Refusing to discount

"3976 F2d at 357.
9

Id at 361.

"

Id at 358.
Id.

17

Baird,976 F2d at 358.
Id.

'9

Id.

10 Id at 360.

'0'Baird,976 F2d at 358.
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the evidentiary weight of the elected minority Republican candidate, the court remarked that "[v]oters in Marion County seem to
prefer Republicans but do not necessarily judge their Republicans
by color." I°2
B.

The Eleventh Circuit Adopted Justice Brennan's Strictly
Race-Neutral Rule

The Eleventh Circuit adopted Justice Brennan's race-neutral
rule in City of CarrolltonBranch of the National Association for
the Advancement of Colored People v Stallings.' In Carrollton,
African-American voters in Carroll County, Georgia, challenged
the single-county-commissioner form of government, alleging that
it impermissibly diluted African-American voting strength.'"
The plaintiffs presented statistical voting data showing racially
polarized voting to establish their Section 2 vote-dilution claim.
The court sustained the vote-dilution claim and stated that
"[u]nder Section Two, it is the status of the candidate as the
chosen representative of a particular racial group, not the race of
the candidate that is important." 5 The court also agreed with
Justice Brennan's position that a court should not examine the
causes of racially polarized voting:
In sum, we would hold that the legal concept of racially
polarized voting, as it related to claims of vote dilution,
refers only to the existence of a correlation between the
race of voters and the selection of certain candidates.
Plaintiffs need not prove causation or intent in order to
prove a prima facie case of racial bloc voting and defendants may not rebut that case with evidence of causation or intent.'0°
C.

The Third and Tenth Circuits
O'Connor's Intermediate Approach

Have

Applied

Justice

Like Justice O'Connor, the Tenth Circuit in Sanchez v
Bond'°7 took an intermediate position, using candidate race as

1

Id at 361.

'o'829 F2d at 1547.
"oi
100

Id at 1549.
Id at 1557.

"
107

Id at 1557-58, citing Gingles, 478 US at 74.
875 F2d at 1488.
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one factor to define which candidates are minority-preferred
candidates. The court rejected Justice White's call for an inquiry
into the causes of racially polarized voting.. and the strictly raceconscious rule.' It also rejected Justice Brennan's standard
that candidate race is irrelevant, noting that five justices "felt
that such a hard and fast rule was contrary to precedent and was
not necessary to the disposition of the case.""
The facts of the case, however, did not compel the court to
explain how to employ candidate race in the adjudication of Section 2 claims. The Sanchez court rejected the claim that Hispanic-Americans in Saguache County, Colorado, lacked an equal
opportunity to elect minority-preferred candidates despite constituting 36 percent of the voting-age population in a county in
which no Hispanic-American ever had won a seat on the County
Commission."' Having decided as a matter of law that elections
with only white candidates could receive consideration, the court
had little difficulty finding that several elected Democratic whites
were minority-preferred candidates because Hispanic-Americans
controlled the Democratic party.' Therefore, the court did not
engage in a more detailed analysis of which candidates were
minority preferred.
Recently, in Jenkins v Red Clay Consolidated School District
Board of Education," the Third Circuit also used candidate
race as one factor, giving both a reason and a method for its use.
The Third Circuit used candidate race as one factor because
"experience does demonstrate that minority candidates will tend
to be candidates of choice among the minority community. " "
But the court used candidate race only as part of a flexible approach that included many factors to identify minority-preferred
candidates."' The court also admitted as evidence statistical
analyses of: voting patterns;". candidate race; minority voter
" The court opined that "a court may not explain away evidence of racial bloc voting
by finding that such voting is caused by underlying differences between the minority and
white population." Id at 1493.
"o The court did "not believe that a per se rule against examining races that have only
white candidates is implicit in Gingles." Id at 1495.
"0 Id at 1494.
" Sanchez, 875 F2d at 1490.
12 Id at 1496.
," 4 F3d at 1103.
.

Id at 1126.

Id at 1129.
Statistical analysis of racial voting patterns is available from exit polls, statistical
analysis of district voting and racial composition, or some combination of the two. For a
discussion of the creation of racial voting patterns from election results and district racial
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turnout; lay testimony by voters and candidates; and minority involvement in the candidate's "initial advancement," campaign,
and financing. "' The court afforded the most weight to statistical analysis of voting patterns, except where a bare majority of
minority voters supported a candidate."' In those elections, the
Jenkins court looked to the other factors, including candidate
9
race.11
The Jenkins court did not examine Justice White's causation
concerns, but it rejected a strictly race-conscious rule as
overinclusive 2 s The court noted that "[t]here may well be minority candidates who cannot be considered the minority
community's representative of choice .... .12 1 The court also
found the strictly race-conscious rule potentially underinclusive,
noting that "there may be majority candidates who truly may be
the minority community's representative of choice."' 22
The plaintiffs in Jenkins, African-American voters, presented
evidence of seven elections in which African-American candidates
lost to white candidates.'2 3 The defendant responded, first, that
plaintiffs had not shown the African-American candidates to be
minority-preferred, and second, that the plaintiffs must include
white-on-white election figures in their case.'
The court inferred that any particular African-American
candidate was "the minority voters' candidate of choice" from the
district court's finding that there was "a strong correlation between the race of the candidate and the preference of [AfricanAmerican] voters." 2 ' The court was careful to note that while
this inference did not completely satisfy the plaintiffs' burden of
proof, it went "a considerable distance" toward it.' 26 The court
held that the plaintiff met the burden with respect to six of the
21 7
seven elections with statistical voting data and lay testimony.

compositions, see Jenkins v Red Clay Consolidated School District Board of Education,
780 F Supp 221 (D Del 1991).
.. See Jenkins, 4 F3d at 1129.
.. Id at 1126-27.
Id at 1129.
120
121
122

Id at 1125.
Jenkins, 4 F3d at 1125.
Id.

12 Id at 1111-12.
121

Id at 1124.
Jenkins, 4 F3d at 1128.

126

Id.

127

Id.

124
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The court further held that the plaintiffs were not required
to present evidence concerning other elections involving only
white candidates, but the defendants could present evidence
showing that a white candidate was minority-preferred.128 The
court noted that a white candidate who received a majority of the
minority community's vote was not necessarily "truly the minority community's representative of choice.""2 The court described
how to determine when a white candidate is minority-preferred:
In deciding which, if any, of the white candidates were
minority-preferred, the court must engage in a detailed,
practical evaluation of the extent to which any particular white candidate was, as a realistic matter, the minority voters' representative of choice. We believe that
there are a number of factors to which a court can look
to determine whether a white candidate may properly
be considered the minority's preferred candidate.30
The court suggested looking at minority-community candidate sponsorship, 3 ' defined as minorities "initially advancing"
the candidacy and helping to finance and run the campaign." 2
The court next suggested evaluating the candidate's support for
the minority community and the social, economic, and political
issues that concern this community, noting that this commitment
to the minority community is indicated by how much time, money, and energy a candidate spent campaigning in minority neighborhoods."3
Two additional factors were offered by the court in its flexible approach to determine when a white candidate is minoritypreferred. First, a higher minority voter turnout is suggestive of
the presence of a minority-preferred candidate. Second, a white
candidate more likely represents the minority community when
the number of minority candidates historically has been low."34

128
129
"'o
131

Id.
Jenkins, 4 F3d at 1126.
Id at 1129.

Id at 1129, citing Note, Voting Rights Act Section 2: Racially Polarized Voting and
the Minority Community's Representative of Choice, 89 Mich L Rev 1038, 1061 (1991).
" See Jenkins, 4 F3d at 1129.
133 Id.
134 Id.
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III. A COURT SHOULD USE CANDIDATE RACE AS ONE FACTOR TO
IDENTIFY MINORITY-PREFERRED CANDIDATES

A court can use candidate race three different ways to identify minority-preferred candidates in a VRA Section 2 vote-dilution
claim. Justice White's strictly race-conscious rule and Justice
Brennan's strictly race-neutral rule are both rigid rules that
prevent a court from accurately identifying candidates preferred
by the minority community. Justice O'Connor's test endorses
using candidate race as one factor in a multifactored approach to
identify minority-preferred candidates.
A.

Candidate Race Is Not a Useful Proxy for "MinorityPreferred Candidates"

Justice White's rule is that minority candidates are always
minority-preferred candidates and that white candidates are
never minority-preferred candidates. 3 ' In other words, a court
should look only at candidate race to determine who is a minority-preferred candidate under Section 2.
Justice White's interpretation of the VRA language reads
more into the text than is present. The relevant text states that a
Section 2 violation exists when minority citizens "have less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in
the political process and to elect representatives of their
choice." 3 ' Section 2 addresses voting acts by citizens, not by a

candidate's race. 137

Justice White, however, was not simply interpreting the
Section 2 term "representatives of their choice," referred to as
3 ' He
minority-preferred candidates in Thornburg v Gingles."
was concerned with the overall purpose of Section 2.13 Justice
White stated that Congress intended Section 2 to apply only to
racially polarized voting caused by racial discrimination. " ° He
opined that Section 2 did not prohibit racially polarized voting
caused by "interest group politics," defined as citizens who vote
for a candidate because of shared economic, political, social, or re-

"'

Thornburg v Gingles, 478 US 30, 83 (1986)(White concurring).

1

42 USC § 1973 (1988).

...Justice Brennan stated this criticism of a strictly race-conscious rule in his Gingles
opinion. Gingles, 478 US at 67-68.
'3'

478 US at 30.

Id at 83 (White concurring).
140 Id.
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ligious beliefs. Justice White stated that a strictly race-conscious rule provided the only way to ensure that successful Section 2 vote-dilution claims were based on racially polarized voting
caused by racial discrimination.'
However, even if one accepts Justice White's premise, his
strictly race-conscious rule is not a good proxy for racial discrimination as the cause of racially polarized voting. Racial discrimination by white voters can cause racially polarized voting even if
the white majority elects a minority candidate or even if the
white majority rejects a white candidate." The reason that racial discrimination can cause racially polarized voting, regardless
of the candidate's race, is that white voters can discriminate not
on the basis of the candidate's race, but on the basis of the
candidate's positions. Regardless of their race, candidates campaign by asserting certain beliefs and promises that often favor
or disfavor certain racial groups. For example, government assistance to the poor in a political subdivision where most of the poor
are minorities may benefit minority citizens over white citizens.
White and minority voters can discriminate on the basis of
race by voting for or against a candidate who espouses such government assistance to the poor, regardless of the candidate's
race. White voters can discriminate on the basis of race by voting
for a minority candidate who opposes such assistance to the poor.
Similarly, minority voters can discriminate on the basis of race
by voting for a white candidate who supports such assistance to
the poor.
How frequently voters consciously discriminate on the basis
of race by voting for candidates that disproportionately benefit
the voter's racial group is a difficult empirical question. A strictly
race-conscious rule ignores this form of discrimination and, therefore, relies on an oversimplified understanding of racial discrimination.
4
1

1

Id .
Gingles, 478 US at 83 (White concurring). The purpose of this Comment is not to

analyze whether a court should consider the causes of racially polarized voting under Section 2. This contentious topic is addressed in Comment, StraightParty Tickets and Redistricting Thickets: Nonracial Motivations for Voter Preferences, 1995 U Chi Legal F 505
(cited in note 48). This Comment cannot, therefore, reject Justice White's strictly raceconscious rule because of its premise that a court will consider the causes of racially
polarized voting.
'" Gary Franks, the first African-American Republican elected to the United States
House of Representatives since the depression, was elected in a district composed predominantly of whites. See Sam Howe Verhovek, Black Republican Candidates Find Niche in
the New Order, NY Times Al (Oct 7, 1994).
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Candidate Race Is Relevant to the Inquiry of Who Is a
Minority-Preferred Candidate

Just as a strictly race-conscious rule to define "minority-preferred candidate" is an overly rigid and inaccurate proxy for determining when racial discrimination causes racially polarized
voting, a strictly race-neutral rule also suffers from inflexibility
and inaccuracy. Under this approach, endorsed by Justice
Brennan,'" candidate race is irrelevant when determining who
is a minority-preferred candidate. This rule would prevent a
court from considering that minority voters more likely prefer
minority candidates to white candidates.
Justice Brennan noted the relationship between candidate
race and minority community voting preferences. He stated in
Gingles that "[b]ecause both minority and majority voters often
select members of their own race as their preferred representatives, it will frequently be the case that an [African-American]
candidate will be the choice of [African-Americans], while a white
candidate is the choice of whites."" Nevertheless, Justice
Brennan's strictly race-neutral rule makes no use of this relationship, a somewhat puzzling result.
Justice Brennan's position on whether a court should consider the causes of racially polarized voting helps explain his rule on
the use of candidate race to define "minority-preferred candidate." He concluded that a court should not consider the causes
of racially polarized voting for two reasons. First, the text of
Section 2 makes no mention of the underlying causes of unequal46
minority opportunity "to elect representatives of their choice."
From this, Justice Brennan inferred that evidence of unequal
opportunity could sustain a Section 2 claim regardless of the
causes of the denied opportunity. 47 Second, the Senate Report
accompanying the 1982 VRA amendments clearly stated that
Section 2 plaintiffs did not need to show intent to discriminate on
the basis of race to prove their vote-dilution claim.'" To Justice
Brennan, a court inquiry into the causes of racially polarized

'" Gingles, 478 US at 66-67.
'4 Id at 68.
1'4 Id at 67.

117Id at 66.
Gingles, 478 US at 66.
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voting was equivalent to requiring plaintiffs to show intent to
discriminate on the basis of race and thus contradicted the legislative history of Section 2.""
Finding that a court should not inquire into the causes of
racially polarized voting by looking at factors beyond statistical
voting patterns, Justice Brennan's strictly race-neutral rule precludes making a causation inquiry. In effect, Justice Brennan
held that the only significant factor in determining racially polarized voting was voter race and that other factors such as candidate race, candidate socioeconomic status, voter socioeconomic
status, and voter political affiliation were irrelevant.
This strictly race-neutral rule suffers from two significant
flaws. First, whether a court should consider the causes of racially polarized voting is a separate and distinct question from which
candidates minorities prefer. The Supreme Court should resolve
the causation question directly, rather than sacrifice accuracy in
the identification of minority-preferred candidates by adopting
rigid rules. Second, a strictly race-neutral rule presumes that a
court can use statistical voting data without candidate race to
identify minority-preferred candidates. In many elections, voting
results alone will clearly identify the candidates preferred by the
minority community. In elections where minority voters do not
clearly favor one candidate, however, candidate race can be a
useful additional determinant, and a court can use candidate
race without inquiring into the causes of racially polarized voting.
C.

A Court Should Identify Minority-Preferred Candidates by
Using a Multifactored Approach that Includes Candidate
Race

Courts should use neither a strictly race-conscious rule nor a
strictly race-neutral rule to identify minority-preferred candidates. Instead, courts should identify minority-preferred candidates using a multifactored approach that treats candidate race
as one of several factors. Statistical voting patterns primarily
identify minority-preferred candidates. Candidate race, along
with other factors, helps when such voting patterns are fuzzy.
When an election demonstrates racially polarized voting and
one of the candidates receives a clear 5 ' majority of the politi-

, 9 Id at 66-67.
150 Use of the term "clear majority" raises the question of how a court should define
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cally cohesive minority vote, a court should give great weight to
those voting results. This is essentially the command of Gingles,
which held that when a plaintiff makes a showing of racially
polarized voting, she establishes evidence of unequal opportunity
to elect "representatives of choice" in violation of Section 2.151
For example, when whites predominantly vote for a winning
candidate and minorities predominantly vote for a losing candidate, the winning candidate is not a minority-preferred candidate.
In a Section 2 case, however, a court often must consider
elections where the minority community almost evenly splits its
vote between two candidates. Although identifying the minoritypreferred candidates in these elections may not be as easy, identifying them remains crucial to the outcome of a Section 2 claim,
as a brief example illustrates.
Suppose that since the time a state approved and instituted
a redistricting plan only five elections have occurred in a new,
highly segregated district that is 70 percent white and 30 percent
Hispanic-American. Suppose further that all five elections have
been two-candidate elections, and that in two of the five elections, the losing candidate claimed to represent the HispanicAmerican minority and received 90 percent of the minority vote
while the winning candidate received 80 percent of the white
vote. Considering only these two elections, a court would sustain
a vote-dilution claim because all three elements of the Gingles
test are satisfied: (1) the Hispanic-American community is large
and geographically compact; (2) the Hispanic-American community has demonstrated political cohesiveness, since 90 percent of
the voters supported the same candidate; and (3) the white majority voted as a group to defeat the minority-preferred candidate
in both of the elections.
However, suppose that in the other three elections the winning candidate received 51 percent of the minority vote, that
minority voter turnout was unusually low,152 and that the winners did not claim to represent minorities. In such a case, the
pivotal question would be whether these three winning candi-

the term "clear" and what factors should be used to do so. The point of a test using
statistical voting results is to recognize the critical importance of actual voting in expressing preferences among candidates. Courts should employ a flexible test giving greater
weight to voting results the larger the majority for a particular candidate.
'61Gingles, 478 US at 56.

Using voter turnout as a factor assumes some baseline of voter turnout for elections which include a minority-preferred candidate.
152
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dates were minority-preferred candidates under Section 2. If a
court deemed them minority-preferred candidates, the plaintiffs
would have difficulty showing dilution in the face of apparent
minority-voter electoral success. If a court did not deem them
minority-preferred candidates, plaintiffs would have a strong
vote-dilution claim based on the first two elections.
To identify minority-preferred candidates in these circumstances, a court should adopt the Third Circuit's approach in
Jenkins v Red Clay ConsolidatedSchool District Board of Education."5 This approach examines actual minority-voter balloting
as the first step to determine which candidates are minority-preferred candidates." 5 For candidates of any race who receive less
than an overwhelming majority of the minority vote, a court
must increasingly look to more than election results. 5 ' A court
should consider: candidate race; minority voter turnout; candidate statements about the constituency they represent; minority
community support for the candidate during the campaign; and
other factors mentioned in the 1982 amendments' legislative
history.156
A court should look at the race of the candidate as one factor
because, as noted above, the minority community more likely will
prefer minority candidates to white candidates.'57 Another important factor is minority voter turnout. Members of the minority
community historically turn out in greater numbers for elections
including a minority-preferred candidate.'
Therefore, the
greater the minority voter turnout, the more likely the candidate
with a modest majority is minority-preferred. On the other hand,
if minority voter turnout is low, minority voters may be merely
choosing between the lesser of two evils.

4 F3d 1103 (3d Cir 1993).
1" Id at 1126.
The Jenkins court was particularly concerned about treating anty candidate who re"'

ceives a majority of the minority vote as a minority-preferred candidate: "[Ilt is important
to look beyond whether a white candidate received a majority of the minority community's

vote and determine whether that white candidate is truly the minority community's
representative of choice." Id. See also Westwego Citizens for Better Government v City of

Westwego, 946 F2d 1109 (5th Cir 1991). The court there stated: -[W]hen there are only
white candidates to choose from it is "virtually unavoidable that certain white candidates
would be supported by a large percentage of [African-American] voters."'" Jenkins, 4 F3d
at 1119, citing Westwego Citizens for Better Government v City of Westwego, 872 F2d 1201,
1208 n 7 (5th Cir 1989).
" Jenkins, 4 F3d at 1128-30.
157

'

Id.
Id. See also Campos v City of Baytown, Tex., 840 F2d 1240, 1245 (5th Cir 1988).
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Characterization of a candidate's campaign can also help in
close cases.15 A court should examine the following areas to
judge whether a candidate represents the minority community:
(1) the candidate's overt claims to represent the minority community; (2) the candidate's position on social, political, and economic
issues traditionally of concern to minorities; (3) the candidate's
expenditures of significant campaign resources in the minority
community; and (4) the candidate's sponsorship by leaders or
other 16members of the minority community during the campaign. 0
A court also should evaluate the Senate Report factors that
bear on this question.'16 For example, whether minorities have
been denied access to the candidate-slating processes is one Senate Report factor. Another is the extent to which racial discrimination in education, employment, health, and other areas has
reduced minority opportunities to participate effectively in the
political process as candidates. When minority opportunities for
will step
nomination shrink, the likelihood that white candidates
62
increases.
community
minority
the
in to represent
D. The Flexible Approach to Defining "Minority-Preferred
Candidate" Most Accurately Identifies Candidates Preferred
by the Minority Community
Justice White's hypothetical in Gingles illustrates how this
proposal would work. Justice White posits "an eight-member
multimember district that is 60% white and 40% [African-Ameri-

'6 See Collins v City of Norfolk, Va., 883 F2d 1232, 1238-39 (4th Cir 1989). See also
Jenkins, 4 F3d at 1129.
160 "[T]he attention which the candidate gave to the particular needs and interests of
the minority community, including the extent to which the candidate campaigned in
predominantly minority areas or addressed predominantly minority crowds and interests,
may be relevant factors." Id at 1129, citing Senate Judiciary Committee Report on the

Voting Rights Act Extension, S Rep No 97-417, 97th Cong, 2d Sess 29 (1982)(cited in note
7).
161 See Note, The Minority-PreferredCandidate in Thornburg v. Gingles: An Argument
for Color-Blind Voting, 8 Notre Dame J of Law, Ethics and Pub Policy 631
(1994)(discussing the usefulness of the Senate Report factors in elections with only white
candidates).
1
"[B]earing in mind the disincentives that may.exist for minority candidates to seek
office, the extent to which minority candidates have run for office and the ease or difficulty with which a minority candidate can qualify to run for office may be relevant considerations." Jenkins, 4 F3d at 1129.
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can] ...[in which] there are six white and two [African-American] Democrats running against six white and two [AfricanAmerican] Republicans." 63
Suppose that 80 percent of the minority community votes for
all eight Democrats. Which candidates are minority-preferred?
This example is straightforward and simple, yet it dramatically
highlights the difference between using voting patterns to define
"minority-preferred candidate" versus using candidate race as an
absolute proxy for "minority-preferred candidate."
Based on the voting patterns, all eight Democrats, the six
white candidates and the two African-American candidates,
would be minority-preferred candidates. Similarly, having received at most 20 percent of the minority vote, neither of the two
African-American Republicans would be minority-preferred. A
court would discount the elections of the African-American Republicans because voting data clearly show that they have not
received the support of the majority of minorities.
By contrast, under a strictly race-conscious approach, all four
of the African-American candidates, Republicans and Democrats,
but none of the white candidates, would be deemed minoritypreferred candidates. Despite receiving only 20 percent of the
minority vote, a court would treat the African-American Republicans as minority-preferred candidates under the race-conscious
approaches of Justice White and the Fifth and Seventh Circuits.
Similarly, despite the fact that Democrats had received 80 percent of the minority vote, a court would not regard the white
Democrats as minority-preferred candidates.
A second example demonstrates the proposed steps when
election results are not as clear. Imagine a Hispanic-American
candidate opposing a white candidate in a two-person election.
Assume the election district is 60 percent white and 40 percent
Hispanic-American; Hispanic-American voter turnout is extremely low compared to previous elections; the minority candidate
receives 60 percent of the Hispanic-American vote; and the white
candidate wins the election with 100 percent of the white vote
and 40 percent of the Hispanic-American vote. Whether the Hispanic-American candidate is legally a minority-preferred candidate is critical to proof of a vote-dilution claim. If she is, then a

'6' Gingles, 478 US at 83 (White concurring).
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court likely would conclude that this election shows racially polarized voting. If she is not, then her election loss probably would
not be evidence of racially polarized voting.16'
This Comment recommends the following analysis. First, the
court should evaluate the distribution of Hispanic-American
voters between the two candidates--60 percent for the minority
candidate and 40 percent for the white candidate. The minority
community probably has not demonstrated a clear preference for
the Hispanic-American candidate because 60 percent does not
constitute an overwhelming majority of the minority community.
Lacking a definitive result from using voting patterns, the
court should then evaluate secondary factors: the existence of
strong minority voter turnout; the Hispanic-American candidate
having claimed to represent the minority community; the Hispanic-American candidate having campaigned in the minority community; and minority candidates in the past having "tend[ed] to
be candidates of choice among the minority community."1" The
only relevant fact presented in the example is that minority voter
turnout was low. This may indicate minority indifference, lessening the probability that the Hispanic-American candidate was a
minority-preferred candidate.
CONCLUSION

Not all minority candidates represent the minority community. Some white candidates represent the minority community. To
protect the rights of minority citizens "to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice," a court
cannot apply a rigid rule, which relies solely on candidate race.
Only by looking beyond a candidate's race to her acts and the
acts of the minority community that she may or may not represent can a court accurately assess whether or not she is a minority-preferred candidate.
This Comment recommends a flexible test. A court should
give great weight to statistical voting results that clearly indicate
minority community preference, but should also consider other
factors in order to identify minority-preferred candidates as the
gap between the number of votes cast for the candidates shrinks.
Additional factors that should be taken into consideration include: candidate race; minority voter turnout; evaluation of the

"'

See note 7.
Jenkins, 4 F3d at 1126.
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candidate's campaign for indications that she represents the
minority community; and the Zimmer v McKeithen1" factors.

1' Zimmer v McKeithen, 485 F2d 1297 (5th Cir 1973), aiTd as East Carroll Parish
School Bd. v Marshall,424 US 636 (1976).

